Today’s hearing examines an issue that should transcend party lines: protecting America’s research enterprise from foreign adversaries who seek to steal, exploit, or undermine the innovations that keep our nation secure and competitive.
For decades, the openness of the U.S. research system has been one of our greatest strengths. But in an era of intensifying global competition—especially from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—that openness has also become a target. The United States invests billions of taxpayer dollars every year in cutting-edge research. Those investments support our economy, drive technological breakthroughs, and underpin our national defense. They must be protected.
Recognizing these growing threats, the first Trump Administration took critical steps to safeguard research from foreign espionage and undue influence. The National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 on National Security Strategy for United States Government-Supported Research and Development or NSPM-33, issued in January 2021, ordered the federal government to establish a unified national strategy to secure U.S. research and development. It was the first comprehensive policy aimed at closing the gaps that foreign actors have exploited for years. The CHIPS and Science Act, passed in 2022, furthered this mandate with additional provisions for agencies and institutions to follow.
Unfortunately, despite these clear directives, implementation has been slow. Guidance was delayed, requirements were left ambiguous, and research institutions were forced to navigate compliance largely on their own. As a result, the burden fell to the current Administration to rapidly implement strict guidance —placing pressure on agencies, universities, and laboratories that should have received clarity much earlier.
In the past year, we have finally seen progress. The National Science Foundation issued updated research security guidance in July that took effect this October. These policies now require institutions to establish formal research security programs, conduct research security assessments, maintain documentation of foreign affiliations, and implement training for all personnel supported by federal research grants.
But there is still much work ahead.
This Committee has repeatedly heard from universities and research organizations that federal guidance remains confusing, inconsistent, or incomplete. And we know from documented cases that these threats are not theoretical. They are real, they are ongoing, and they demand a coordinated national response.
To be clear, the CCP is not our only concern. Other malign foreign actors are also seeking to exploit gaps in our research security framework. That is why implementation of these directives must be thorough, timely, and unambiguous, making today’s discussion all the more important.
American science has long benefited from global engagement, but that engagement must be reciprocal. Every federally funded institution—large or small, public or private—must follow the law, disclose foreign affiliations, manage conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment, and protect its data and infrastructure from theft or manipulation.
Congress has a responsibility to ensure that federal agencies enforce these requirements and that institutions receiving taxpayer dollars meet them. These requirements are a starting point. Many institutions may require more robust protections given the nature of the work they conduct. Oversight is not optional; it is essential. The integrity of our research enterprise—and our national security—depends on it.
Today, we will evaluate the progress made in implementing NSPM-33 and the CHIPS and Science Act, identify the barriers that still impede compliance, and determine whether additional legislative or regulatory action is needed. Our objective is clear: to ensure that America’s research remains secure, competitive, and worthy of the trust the American people place in it.